

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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USCINCEUR

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 3856

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: TRILATERAL MEETING ON OPTION III, JULY 18, 1975

REF: A. USNATO 3850 DTG 191218Z JUL 75

B. STATE 169248

C. USNATO 3812

D. STATE 165670

E. USNATO 3764

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PERSENTS A FULL REPORT OF THE JULY 18
TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. SUMMARY AND REQUESTS FOR ACTION ARE
IN REF A. END SUMMARY.

1. TRILATERAL MEETING TOOK PLACE IN U.S. MISSION, AND LASTED
ABOUT TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS. PRINCIPL U.S. SPOKESMAN WAS
AMB. RESOR; PRINCIPAL FRG SPOKESMAN WAS RUTH; PRINCIPAL UK
SPOKESMAN WAS TICKELL. ATMOSPHERE WAS COMPLETELY BUSINESS-
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LIKE. MISSION HAD PROVIDED COPIES OF U.S. DRAFT OF SUPPLEMENT
(TEXT COPIED FROM REF B) TO UK AND FRG MISSIONS SEVERAL HOURS
DARLIER, BUT UK AND FRG REPS HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO READ IT CARE-
FULLY PRIOR TO MEETING.

2. U.S. REP INTRODUCED U.S. SUPPLEMENT DRAFT, RECALLING THAT THE FRG HAD REQUESTED THAT IT COVER ALL SIGNIFICANT INTRA-ALLIED AGREEMENTS, EVEN IF THIS MEANT DUPLICATION OF MATERIAL IN AHG GUIDANCE. HE REQUESTED THAT UK AND FRG REPS IDENTIFY ANY TOPIC WHICH HAD BEEN OMITTED ON WHICH THEY THOUGHT ALLIANCE AGREEMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY. MEETING THEN WENT THROUGH DRAFT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH.

3. U.S. REP POINTED OUT RELATIVE TO PARA 3 THAT U.S. DRAFT DID NOT EXCLUDE FIXING A NUMERICAL LEVEL FOR THE COMMON CEILING DURING PHASE I IF THE EAST INDICATED A DESIRE TO DO SO. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE BEST CONTEXT FOR THE FRG TO ADVANCE THE POINTS IN THE PAPER THEY HAD GIVEN TO U.S. JULY 17 (REF C). FRG REP SAID THAT FRG PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO AMEND PARA 3 TO INDICATE THAT THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TWO ALTERNATIVES: EITHER AN AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING PLUS AN "UNDERSTANDING OF MODALITIES," OR ELSE AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST TO REACH A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE II TOGETHER WITH AGREEMENT ON THE FORCE LEVELS AS OF THE END OF PHASE I. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, FRG REP ELUCIDATED AS FOLLOWS:

-- WHICHEVER ALTERNATIVE WAS CHOSEN, THE NECESSARY AGREEMENTS WITH THE EAST WOULD BE REACHED IN PHASE I.

-- WHICHEVER ALTERNATIVE WAS CHOSEN, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREEMENT WITH EAST IN PHASE I ON THE COLLECTIVITY OF THE COMMON CEILING, AND ON "MANPOWER EMPHASIS." COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS MEANS THAT COMMON CEILING WOULD APPLY ONLY TO MANPOWER, OR THAT EAST WOULD AGREE IN PHASE I TO A "MANPOWER EMPHASIS" IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS. END COMMENT.

-- THE ALTERNATIVE TO AN AGREEMENT IN PHASE I ON THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING WOULD ENTAIL BOTH AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE TO A COMMON CEILING AND AGREEMENT ON DATA WHICH WOULD MAKE IT UNMISTAKABLE THAT REACHING THIS COMMON CEILING
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WOULD REQUIRE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD NOT MATTER WHETHER THIS AGREED DATA APPLIED TO THE SITUATION BEFORE OR AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

-- IN THE EVENT THAT THERE IS NO PHASE I AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON THE NUMERICAL LEVEL FOR THE COMMON CEILING, THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES ON THE LOWEST CEILING LEVEL (I.E., LARGEST REDUCTIONS) THEY COULD ACCEPT.

-- THE FRG BELIEVES THAT THE GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP NEED NOT GO BEYOND SAYING THAT THE COMMON CEILING MUST BE "APPROPRIATELY DEFINED" AND "MIGHT" BE SET AT 700,000/900,000. THE SUPPLEMENT--PRESUMABLY IN PARA 3-- WOULD EXPAND UPON WHAT

ALTERNATIVES THE ALLIES WOULD CONSIDER ACCEPTABLE MEANINGS OF
"APPROPRIATELY DEFINED."

-- PARA 8 OF THE FRG PAPER (REF C) WAS NOT INTENDED TO
SUGGEST THAT WE WOULD LET THE EAST CHOOSE WHICH ALTERNATIVE
IT PREFERENCES. THE POINT PARA 8 OF REF C WAS INTENDED TO MAKE
IS THAT THE FRG BELIEVES THAT THE EAST MAY BE MORE READY TO
AGREE ON A NUMERICAL LEVEL FOR THE COMMON CEILING THAN TO
AGREE EXPLICITLY THAT A MONPOWER DISPARITY EXISTS.

-- THE FRG WOULD LIKE THE ALLIANCE TO EXAMINE WHETHER THE
TWO FRG ALTERNATIVES ARE EQUALLY ACCEPTABLE. IF THEY ARE,
THEN THE SUPPLEMENT SHOULD RECORD THIS, AND THE CHOICE WOULD
BE MADE LATER IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT THE NEGOTIATIONS REVEAL
ABOUT EASTERN PREFERENCES AND AREAS OF FLEXIBILITY.

4. UK REP SAID THAT UK POSITION IS STILL THAT THE GUIDANCE
TO THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD SPECIFY THAT THE NUMERICAL LEVEL
OF THE COMMON CEILING "WOULD" BE AGREED IN PHASE I. HOWEVER,
THE UK WILL CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE FRG POSITION. THIS ISSUE
WAS NOT ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE, AND FURTHER CONSIDERATION COULD
TAKE PLACE IN THE SPC RATHER THAN TRILATERALLY. THIS WAS
AGREED, AND FRG WILL PRESENT ITS IDEA AS PROPOSED MODIFICATION
TO PARA 3 OF U.S. PAPER.

5. REGARDING PARA 7, UK MOD REP (GEHRATY) OBSERVED THAT U.S.
WORDING WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW A SMALL TANK
ARMY AND TAKE THE REMAINDER OF THE 1700 TANKS FROM TRAINING
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UNITS. THIS SHOULD BE AVOIDED. HE THEREFORE SUGGESTED INSERTION
OF WORD "COMBAT" AFTER THE WORD "ADDITIONAL" IN THE THIRD
SENTENCE OF PARA 7.

6. REGARDING PARA 8 OF THE U.S. DRAFT, FRG REP ASKED WHY IT
SPOKE OF U.S. AS WELL AS SOVIET WITHDRAWAL TO HOMELAND. U.S.
REP REPLIED THAT ON SUCH A MATTER RECIPROCITY WAS INEVITABLE,
AND SPC SHOULD CONSIDER REALISTIC PROSPECTS.

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7. REGARDING PARA 10, FRG REP ASKED WHY SSM LAUNCHERS WERE NOT CHARACTERIZED AS LAUNCHERS OF "NUCLEAR" BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 500 KM. U.S. REPS EXPLAINED THAT SINCE ALL FORESEEABLE LAUNCHERS OF MISSILES OF THAT RANGE LAUNCHED NUCLEAR MISSILES, THIS WORD WOULD ADD NOTHING BUT FURTHER CONFUSION. UK REP REPLIED THAT IF IT WOULD MAKE NO PARTICULAR DIFFERENCE, WORD SHOULD GO IN SO AS TO REINFORCE NUCLEAR CHARACTER OF OPTION III PACKAGE. U.S. REPS NOTED THAT WASHINGTON HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THIS POINT. COMMENT: U.S. TRILATERAL REPS DO NOT, REPEAT NOT BELIEVE THIS CHANGE SHOULD BE MADE, AND NEITHER FRG NOR UK REPS SEEMED MUCH ATTACHED TO IT. HOWEVER, IF U.S. DOES NOT MAKE THIS CHANGE, MISSION WOULD APPRECIATE EXPLANATORY LANGUAGE TO USE IN SPC. END COMMENT.

8. REGARDING PARA 15, UK MOD REP OBSERVED THAT U.S. DRAFT ADDS A NEW REQUIREMENT. ALLIES HAVE ALWAYS CONTEMPLATED SOVIET SUB-CEILING WITHIN OVERALL CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MAN-SECRET

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POWER; THIS PARA ADDS SOVIET SUB-CEILING WITHIN OVERALL NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR AIR FORCES. UK HAS, HOWEVER, NO PARTICULAR OBJECTION. FRG REPS DID NOT SEE OBJECTION AT FIRST GLANCE, BUT OBSERVED THAT IMPLICATIONS OF THIS CHANGE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

9. UK MOD REP SUGGESTED INSERTION OF WORD "COLLECTIVELY" NEAR END OF FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 18, BEFORE PHRASE "TO AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER."

10. FRG REP REQUESTED CONFIRMATION THAT U.S. WISHED TO SETTLE THE ISSUE OF INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING PRIOR TO THE TABLING OF OPTION III IN VIENNA. HE SAID THAT THE RECENT DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS MADE THIS IMPERATIVE IN HIS VIEW. U.S. REP AGREED, POINTING OUT THAT WHILE ALLIES MIGHT REPEAT MIGHT DECIDE THEY WANTED TO CODIFY AN AIR MANPOWER DISPARITY, SUCH A DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN BEFORE OPTION III

WAS TABLED. U.S. OPPOSED ALLOWING SUCH A DISPARITY, AND WANTED ALLIANCE AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING. UK AND FRG REPS AGREED.

1. UK AND FRG REPS AGREED THAT INTRODUCTION OF THIS PAPER INTO SPC WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AT NEXT SPC MEETING, WHICH IS JULY 22. THEY CONSIDER SPC BEST FORUM TO WORK REMAINING ISSUES, AND RESERVE THE RIGHT TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IN THE SPC AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF U.S. DRAFT.

12. DISCUSSION TURNED TO UK PAPER (REF D). U.S. REP SUGGESTED DELETION OF LANGUAGE IN PARA 3 AFTER THE WORD "MANAGEABLE," SUGGESTING THAT SEPARATION OF NUCLEAR AND TANK LIMITATIONS WAS USEFUL GUIDE TO ALLIANCE DISCUSSION BUT NOT NECESSARILY BEST WAY TO PUT THE POINT TO THE EAST. UK REP ACCEPTED POINT AND AGREED TO DELETE PASSAGE. U.S. REP SUGGESTED DELETION OF BULK OF PARAGRAPH 10 (EVERYTHING AFTER SECOND SENTENCE, ENDING WITH "ELUCIDATION") ON GROUNDS THAT THIS UK LANGUAGE USEFULLY STATES THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO LIMIT SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COMPARABLE TO U.S. SYSTEMS IN OPTION III, BUT THAT U.S. DID NOT WANT THIS LANGUAGE DISCUSSED IN SPC WHILE WE WERE STILL WORKING ON THE PROBLEM IN WASHINGTON. UK REP AGREED TO DELETION, ON UNDERSTANDING THAT U.S. WOULD MAKE USE OF SUBSTANCE OF THIS MATERIAL
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IN DRAFTING ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE ON THIS SUBJECT FOR SUPPLEMENT PAPER. UK MOD REP ASKED HOW U.S. WOULD APPROACH THIS PROBLEM, WHICH UK FOUND VERY DIFFICULT, AND U.S. REP REPLIED THAT THE FIRST STEP WAS TO ASSEMBLE INTELLIGENCE ON LIKELY FUTURE SOVIET PROGRAMS IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSTRAINTS.

13. FRG REP EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT UK CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING ON TANKS (PARA 14 OF REF D) BECAUSE SUCH A DEMAND MIGHT LEAD TO UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET DEMANDS FOR COMMON CEILINGS ON NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OR OTHER ARMAMENTS.

14. IT WAS AGREED THAT UK WOULD TABLE "BOWDLERIZED" VERSION OF ITS PAPER IN SPC IN NEAR FUTURE AS A CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE DISCUSSION. BUT WOULD NOT ASK SPC TO WORK OR AGREE ON THE PAPER.

15. FALLBACK POSITION ON ALLIED LIMITATIONS. UK REP STATED THAT HIS MINISTERS REQUIRED THAT BEFORE OPTION III IS TABLED, THERE BE AN AGREEMENT ON THE FALLBACK (WHETHER THERE WOULD EVER BE ONE, AND IF SO, WHAT IT WOULD BE) FROM THE OPENING POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LIMITATIONS WHATEVER ON ALLIED ARMAMENTS (PARA 9 OF DRAFT GUIDANCE TO AHG). UK REP SAID THAT ON SECURITY GROUNDS THE UK COULD AGREE THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN THE SPC AND HAD THEREFORE AGREED TO REMOVE THE TOPIC FROM THE PAPER THE UK WOULD CIRCULATE, BUT THAT A TRI-LATERAL AGREEMENT WAS NECESSARY. EVEN THOUGH A FALLBACK POSITION MIGHT NEVER BE NEEDED OR USED, THE UK, FRG, AND U.S. MUST

AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES ON WHAT IT WOULD BE. U.S. REP ASKED WHETHER UK CONCERN WAS TO PROTECT ITS PROGRAM TO INTRODUCE JAGUARS INTO THE NGA, AND UK REP REPLIED THAT THAT WAS A PRACTICAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. THE UK SUPPORTS THE POSITION IN PARA 9 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE, BUT SUSPECTS THAT THIS POSITION IS UNTENABLE. WHILE THE UK NORMALLY DID NOT LIKE TO DISCUSS FALLBACKS IN ADVANCE, THIS WAS THE EXCEPTION.

16. FRG REP OBSERVED THAT THEIR PAPER ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF TANKS TO MANPOWER (TRANSMITTED IN REF E) WAS RELEVANT TO THIS PROBLEM, AND DISTRIBUTED AT THE TABLE A COMPANION PAPER ON AIRCRAFT AND MANPOWER (TRANSMITTED SEPTTEL). SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION REGARDING THESE PAPERS BROUGHT OUT THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE FRG WOULD LIKE TO CIRCULATE THEM IN THE SPC EVEN-
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TUALLY, BUT WILL CIRCULATE NEW DRAFTS TRILATERALLY FIRST, AND UNDERSTANDS THAT U.S. AND UK HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT ANY BROADER CIRCULATION.

-- THE FRG AGREES THAT THEY NEED REVISION PRIOR TO SPC CIRCULATION, AND WILL WELCOME U.S. AND UK COMMENTS. SUCH COMMENTS SHOULD BE FRANK, AND SHOULD BE SENT DIRECTLY TO THE FRG.

-- THE FRG WROTE THESE PAPERS BECAUSE THEY VERY MUCH WANT THE CONCLUSION--THAT LIMITATIONS ON MANPOWER ARE SUFFICIENT TO LIMIT ARMAMENTS SUCH AS AIRCRAFT AND TANKS-- TO BE TRUE. THEY WANT THE REVISED PAPER TO MAKE THE BEST POSSIBLE CASE FOR THIS POSITION. IF THE BEST POSSIBLE CASE IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH, THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT TO DO.

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-- THE UK DOES NOT THINK THE TANK/MANPOWER PAPER IS VERY GOOD.

-- THE FRG WOULD LIKE A TRILATERAL MEETING OF MILITARY EXPERTS ON ITS TWO PAPERS, WHILE UK AND U.S. REPS DOUBTED THE UTILITY OF SUCH A MEETING.

-- AMONG THE FLAWS IN THE TANK/MANPOWER PAPER WHICH THE FRG RECOGNIZES IS THAT IT USES INACCURATE DATA

17. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, THE FRG REP CLARIFIED THAT THE FRG DOES BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK AN EXPLICIT LIMIT ON RESIDUAL SOVIET TANKS, DESPITE ANY POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS TO THE CONTRARY IN THE TANK/MANPOWER PAPER.

18. AS IT EMERGED FROM THE ENSUING DISCUSSION, THE UK VIEW IS THAT THE INITIAL ALLIED POSITION WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO DEFEND. THE UK IS WORKING ON A PAPER (UK REP REFUSED TO SPEC-
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ULATE ON COMPLETION DATE) WHICH WILL LAY OUT AND EXPLORE THREE POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO SOVIET DEMANDS FOR SOME LIMITATION ON NON-U.S. ARMAMENTS COMPARABLE TO THOSE REDUCED BY THE U.S. IN

OPTION III:

A) A FLAT REFUSAL; STONEWALLING. THE UK EVIDENTLY DOUBTS THAT THIS WOULD WORK IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESSURES TO WHICH ALLIES COULD BE SUBJECTED.

B) POINT TO INDIRECT LIMITATIONS, SUCH AS THE CLAIM THE FRG WISHES TO MAKE THAT LIMITATIONS ON MANPOWER ARE ADEQUATE TO MEET THE NEEDS WITH WHICH THE EAST WOULD JUSTIFY DEMANDS

FOR ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS.

C) AGREE TO LIMITATIONS ON ALLIED EQUIPMENT, PRESUMABLY STRICTLY LIMITED IN SCOPE. THE UK INTENDS TO EXAMINE WHETHER SUCH LIMITATIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, HOW MUCH DAMAGE THEY MIGHT DO, ETC.

19. THE FRG POSITION, AS IT EMERGED FROM THE DISCUSSION, IS THAT LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS OF ALLIED COUNTRIES IN THE NGA ARE ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE, BECAUSE THIS WOULD IMPOSE AN UN-

ACCEPTABLE DISCRIMINATION UPON THESE COUNTRIES COMPARED TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE NGA, WHOSE TOTAL STOCKS OF ARMAMENTS WOULD BE UNLIMITED. SUCH DISCRIMINATION AS APPLIED TO MANPOWER IS ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE RESERVES CAN BE MOBILIZED, BUT MOBILIZING RESERVES REQUIRES HAVING EQUIPMENT FOR THESE RESERVES TO USE. THEREFORE, THE ALLIES MUST EITHER FLATLY REFUSE TO DISCUSS ANY LIMITS ON NON-U.S. ARMAMENTS, OR ELSE MUST MAINTAIN THAT MANPOWER LIMITATIONS ARE SUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR THE SOVIETS. THE FRG WANTS TO EXPLORE THE LATTER POSSIBILITY VERY CAREFULLY, BECAUSE THEY CAN SEE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE TO STONE-WALLING.

20. FRG REP MADE SEVERAL REMARKS INDICATING FRG REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY LIMITATION--DIRECT OR INDIRECT, EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT--ON FRG ARMAMENTS. UK REP AVOIDED SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT LIMITS ON FRG ARMAMENTS WERE INEVITABLE IN MBFR, BUT DID INDICATE THAT HE THOUGHT FRG APPROACH OF MANPOWER LIMITS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR SECRET

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ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS WAS INTELLECTUALLY UNTENABLE, AND THAT FLAT REFUSAL TO LIMIT ARMAMENTS COULD BE POLITICALLY UNTENABLE. ("WHAT WILL YOU DO WHEN AN AGREEMENT IS NEAR, AND GROMYKO CALLS YOUR MINISTER AT 11 AT NIGHT AND KISSINGER CALLS HIM AT 12?")

21. U.S. REP DID NOT ENTER INTO FRG-UK DIALOGUE, BUT DID SUGGEST TO FRG REP THAT PROBLEM OF AVOIDING ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS WAS EASIER IF THOSE ARMAMENTS WHOSE REDUCTIONS WERE BARGAINED FOR WERE CONCEPTUALLY SEPARATED FROM ALL OTHER ARMAMENTS. FRG REP DID NOT DISPUTE POINT THAT ADDRESSING ALLIED REBUTTAL TO EASTERN DEMANDS TO ISSUE OF "ALL ALLIED ARMAMENTS" MADE SITUATION TACTICALLY MORE DIFFICULT, BUT EVIDENTLY FEARS THAT TAKING THIS APPROACH WOULD EXPOSE FRG TO LIMITATIONS ON THEIR EQUIVALENTS OF OPTION III CCOMPONENTS. FRG DOES NOT WISH TO RESIST PRESSURE FOR LIMITATIONS ON, FOR EXAMPLE, FRG TANKS EXCEPT BY USE OF ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO FRG PERSHING. U.S. REP SUGGESTED THAT "THREATENING ELEMENTS" RATIONALE COULD BE A USEFUL ALLIED DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET DEMANDS TO LIMIT MORE, AND FRG REP REPLIED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT IN SOVIET EYES THE MOST THREATENING ELEMENT WAS THE BUNDESWEHR.

22. COMMENT. THIS ISSUE WILL NOT COME TO A HEAD UNTIL UK COMPLETES ITS PAPER AND CIRCULATES IT TRILATERALLY, BUT THEN SERIOUS TROUBLE APPEARS TO BE IN STORE. FRG APPEARS TO WANT TRILATERAL AGREEMENT THAT ANY LIMITATIONS ON ALLIED ARMAMENTS WOULD BE AN UNACCEPTABLE PRICE TO PAY FOR MBFR. IF FRG INDEED BELIEVES THAT LIMITATIONS ON ITS ARMAMENTS ARE INHERENTLY DISCRIMINATORY, THE UK ARGUMENTS IN PARA 20 ABOVE MAY NOT MAKE MUCH OF AN IMPRESSION. END COMMENT.

23. THE FRG REPS STATED THAT FRG NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT

HOLDINGS WOULD NOT RISE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, BUT THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY WHETHER THEY MIGHT FALL, AND IF SO, BY HOW MUCH. FRG ALSO CIRCULATED A PAPER COMMENTING ON THE U.S. APPROACH TO AIRCRAFT DEFINITION (TRANSMITTED SEPTTEL) FOR WHICH PRESENT GUIDANCE IS GENERALLY ADEQUATE.

24. DISCUSSION OF SPC WORK PROGRAM REPORTED IN PARA 10, REF A.

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25. FURTHER TRILATERALS. NO DATES FOR FURTHER TRILATERAL MEETINGS WERE MENTIONED. WHEN THE UK HAS COMPLETED ITS PAPER ON FALLBACKS REGARDING ALLIED ARMAMENTS, A TRILATERAL DISCUSSION MIGHT PROVE USEFUL. IN ADDITION, THE UK AND FRG WOULD PROBABLY APPRECIATE AN ADVANCE LOOK AT THE U.S. DRAFT PARAGRAPH FOR THE SUPPLEMENT ON "LIMITS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS COMPARABLE TO THOSE REDUCED BY THE U.S.", THOUGH THIS SUBJECT BY ITSELF WOULD NOT SEEM TO JUSTIFY A TRILATERAL MEETING. PEREZ

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